Cryptanalysis of Khatoon et al.'s ECC-based Authentication Protocol for
  Healthcare Systems by Nikooghadam, Mahdi & Amintoosi, Haleh
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
08
42
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
0 J
un
 20
19
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Cryptanalysis of Khatoon et al.’s ECC-based
Authentication Protocol for Healthcare Systems
Mahdi Nikooghadam · Haleh Amintoosi*
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract Telecare medical information systems are gaining rapid popularity
in terms of providing the delivery of online health-related services such as on-
line remote health profile access for patients and doctors. Due to being installed
entirely on Internet, these systems are exposed to various security and privacy
threats. Hence, establishing a secure key agreement and authentication process
between the patients and the medical servers is an important challenge. Re-
cently, Khatoon et.al proposed an ECC-based unlink-able authentication and
key agreement method for healthcare related application in smart city. In this
article, we provide a descriptive analysis on their proposed scheme and prove
that Khatoon et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to known-session-specific temporary
information attack and is not able to provide perfect forward secrecy.
Keywords Healthcare · Authentication · Key Agreement · Cryptanalysis ·
TMIS
1 Introduction
With recent advances in information technology, we are facing a growth in
the development of healthcare related applications, such as telecare medical
information systems (TMISs) which have been established to provide online
healthcare services for patients. In such systems, the patients’ medical infor-
mation such as blood pressure are stored in medical databases. In order to
make use of remote health care related services, the patient has to register
with the TMIS medical server. To provide service for the patient, the first
step is to verify the legitimacy of the patient by the medical server. If pa-
tient’s legitimacy is verified, healthcare staff and/or doctors are contacted to
provide him with the required healthcare consultation.
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Table 1 Notations used in Khatoon et al.’s scheme [6]
symbol description
q a large prime
e a bilinear map e: G1 ×G1 → G2
P The generator of G1
IDi, PWi, Bi Patient’s identity, password and biometric information
S TMIS server
s Master private key s ∈ Z∗q of S
Ppub Public key Ppub = sP of S
h A hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → Zq
H A hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1
Tki Encryption with symmetric key ki
Ts, Ti Time stamp of Ui and S
Registration Phase
patient Ui TMIS server S
Computes Ci = PW
i ⊕HB(Bi)
Ci, IDi
(Secure Channel)
S checks the IDi in its database
if new, S records N=0
otherwise S records N=N+1
Computes Vi = h(IDi||Ci) and Wi = Ci ⊕ h(IDi||s)
Customizes SCi with(Vi,Wi, Ppup, h,H,HB)
sends it securely to Ui
Despite all the benefits, establishing a secure and privacy-aware commu-
nication between the patient and the server is still a major challenge. Failure
to provide secure communication may enable the adversary to obtain unau-
thorized access to the patients’ private health data or inject falsified data into
the system, resulting in false diagnosis or injury. Hence, research has recently
focused on providing secure authentication and communication schemes for
TMISs [1,2,3,4,5,6].
Recently, Khatoon et al. [6] proposed an anonymous and mutual key agree-
ment scheme based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for TMIS and
claimed that their protocol withstands various attacks and satisfies the ba-
sic security requirements such as anonymity and un-linkability. In this paper,
we show that their proposed scheme is vulnerable to known-session-specific
temporary information attack and does not provide perfect forward secrecy.
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Login and Authentication Phase
Patient Ui TMIS server S
Ui insert his smart card SCi in card reader
Input IDi, PWi and imprints Bi
the SCi computes h(IDi||PWi ⊕HB(Bi))
Checks h(IDi||PWi ⊕HB(Bi)) = Vi
if invalid, SCi aborts the session
Otherwise,
selects ri ∈ Zp and fresh Ti
Computes Qi = H(IDi), Qs = H(IDs)
Ri = ri.Qi, Ki = e(Ppub, ri.Qs)
Authi = Eki(IDi||Ti||ri)
Ri, Ti, Authi
Upon receiving LRi, S checks
∆T < Ts − Ti if valid it proceed
And calculate Ks = e(s,Ri.P )
decrypts Authi to obtain (IDi||Ti||ri)
Computes Qi = H(IDi)
checks Ri = ri.Qi. If valid
Then S generates a random number rs
Computes Qs = H(IDs), Rs = rs.Qi, Ls = rs.Ri
Auths = h(Ti||Ri||Ts||Rs||Ls||Ks)
SKs = h(Ti||Ri||Ts||Rs||Ls)
Rs, Ts, Auths
verifies ∆T < Ts − Ti
if valid
Computes Li = ri.Rs
verifies Auths = h(Ti||Ri||Ts||Rs||Ls||Ki)
And computes SKi = h(Ti||Ri||Ts||Rs||Ls)
Fig. 1 Registration and Authentication phase of Khatoon et al.’s scheme [6]
2 Overview and Cryptanalysis of Khatoon et al.’s Scheme
In this section, we review and analyse Khatoon et al.’s scheme [6] and show
that it suffers from known-session-specific temporary information attack and
cannot guarantee perfect forward secrecy.
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2.1 Overview of Khatoon et al.’s Scheme
The notations used in Khatoon et al.’s scheme are shown in Table 1. Their
proposed protocol is also demonstrated in Figure 1. Before accessing the med-
ical server services, the patient has to register to the server. To do so, the
medical server sends the required log in information to the patient through
the registration phase. Once registration is done, the patient is able to share
a key with the server via the authentication phase. The shared key can then
be used for their subsequent secure communications.
2.2 Cryptanalysis of Khatoon et al.’s Scheme
In this section, we first demonstrate that the scheme proposed by Khatoon
et al. [6] suffers from the known-session-specific temporary information attack
and then, show that it is not able to provide perfect forward secrecy.
2.2.1 Vulnerability to Known-session-specific Temporary Information Attack
As mentioned in [1], known-session-specific temporary information attack oc-
curs when the adversary is successful in obtaining the session key by knowing
the session random numbers. In the following, we demonstrate that Khatoon
et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to known-session-specific temporary information
attack.
– As mentioned in the authentication step of Khatoon et al.’s scheme in
Figure 1, Ri is exchanged on public channel, so, the adversary is able to
obtain it. Also, rs is a random parameter which is supposed to be accessible
by the adversary in known-session-specific temporary information attack.
Hence, the adversary is able to compute Ls as Ls = rs.Ri.
– As shown in Figure 1, the session key SK is computed as SKi = h(Ti||Ri||Ts||Rs||Ls).
Parameters Ri, Ti, Rs, Ts are exchanged on public channel, so they are
available to the adversary. As stated above, the adversary is able to com-
pute Ls. Having all the parameters included in SK, he is now able to
compute the session key SK. This clearly states that Khatoon et al.’s
scheme is prone to known-session-specific temporary information attack.
2.2.2 Perfect Forward Insecurity
The protocol is said to provide perfect forward secrecy if, by knowing the
longterms such as the server’s public/private keys, the adversary is not able
to compute the session key SK. In the following, we show that Khatoon et
al.’s scheme does not guarantee perfect forward secrecy.
– Lets assume that the adversary knows the medical server’s public and
private keys. So, he is able to compute Ks as Ks = e(s,Ri.P ), since Ri is
available on public channel.
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– As Ks = Ki, he is now able to decrypt Authi and obtain ri as Authi =
Eki(IDi||Ti||ri).
– Having ri and Ri on public channel, the adversary computes Li = ri.Rs.
– On the other hand, Li = ri.Rs = ri.rs.Qi = rs.ri.Qi = rs.Ri = Ls. So, the
adversary already has Ls at hand too.
– Having Ls computed in the above step and having access to Ti, Ri, Ts and
Rs on public channel, the adversary is now able to compute the session
key SK as SKi = h(Ti||Ri||Ts||Rs||Ls). This means that Khatoon et al.’s
scheme is not able to provide perfect forward secrecy.
3 Conclusion and Future Work
Providing a secure and privacy-preserving communication channel between
different patients and medical systems in remote healthcare systems has gain
lots of attention. In this article, we reviewed the authentication and key agree-
ment protocol presented by Khatoon et al., and demonstrated that it is prone
to known-session-specific temporary information attack and does not provide
perfect forward secrecy. In future, we plan to present a secure and privacy
preserving registration and key agreement scheme for healthcare systems that
addresses the shortcomings of related work.
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